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The ascendency of science in modern times makes it commonplace to accept that
science presents the only true and correct image of reality. This has led to
naturalization attempts in various domains, from epistemology, metaphysics, to
philosophy of mind, and ethics. Naturalistic ethics may mean different things
depending on what we consider natural. David Copp equates it with the empirical –
emphasizing the relevance of empirical evidence to justification – while admitting
that what is empirical is itself problematic.1 One might count as empirical that
which can be observed by our physical senses, or more narrowly that which can be
studied by the natural sciences. Modern scientific naturalism limits the natural to
what can be successfully explained by science but a more liberal naturalism may
define as natural whatever does not contradict the laws of nature without necessarily
being accountable by science.2 Naturalistic ethics that accept modern scientific
naturalism differ according to how broadly each conceives the scope of science, for
example, whether it is equated with physics, or admits of other natural sciences
without reducing them to physics, or even more broadly, includes human sciences
understood as methodologically and ontologically irreducible to the natural
sciences. Ethical naturalism has both metaphysical and epistemological stakes: 1)
ethics is only possible if grounded in natural facts, since claims about the
supernatural are false or empty given that only the natural has a place in reality; 2)
ethical knowledge is acquired in ways similar to other knowledge, through
scientific/empirical methods of inquiry that acknowledge the relevance of facts as
evidence in human reasoning – mystical intuitions and divine revelations, for
S. Tan (&)
Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore,
3 Arts Link AS3 #05-17, Singapore 117570, Singapore
e-mail: phitansh@nus.edu.sg
1 David Copp, Morality in a Natural World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 254.
2 Mario De Caro and Alberto Voltolini, “Is Liberal Naturalism Possible?” in Mario De Caro and David
Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism and Normativity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 69–86.
123
J Value Inquiry (2015) 49:247-265
DOI 10.1007/s10790-014-9474-5
Published in The Journal of Value Inquiry,
Vol. 49, Issue 1, January 2015,
page 247-265
example, are not sources of ethical knowledge or authority. This second order
ethical discourse may or may not affect any particular normative ethics, depending
on whether the latter’s content can be specified without reference to supernatural
entities and what is the accepted authority that guarantees its truth or validity.
Normative ethics that predate the naturalistic trend in metaethics or even those
originating in (retrospectively) anti-naturalistic contexts may be naturalized by
interpreting or reconstructing them to be compatible with naturalism at the meta-
ethical level, while preserving the first order normative claims about what should be
done or how one should live.
Donald Munro suggests naturalizing Confucian ethics based on ancient texts
dating back more than two millennia by providing it with modern scientific basis.3
He argues that the findings of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology today
support early Confucian insights into human nature and development: common
human nature consisting in universal traits coexisting with human malleability; love
and sympathy is among our universal traits; altruism is reciprocal; ethical concepts
owe more to innate social emotions than traditionally recognized by Western
psychologists or ethicists emphasizing reason opposed to emotion; human beings
are innately predisposed to learn through imitation.4 For Munro, what will survive
of the early Confucian text, the Mencius, is a naturalistic ethics based on a
biological-psychological theory of human nature that can be empirically tested.5
Some would reject Munro’s approach on the grounds that early Confucian
discussions of xing性 were not about human nature as understood in contemporary
naturalistic ethics, nor did the ancient Chinese share our modern concept of nature.
Philip Ivanhoe argues that the Mencius offers a religious ethics by viewing tian 天
(heaven) as “an impersonal yet concerned agent and a force for human Good” that is
a source of ethical warrant, even though the broad semantic range of the concept of
tian at that time included natural phenomena.6 Instead of assuming the desirability
of naturalization and seeking naturalistic support for their normative ethics, I shall
explore the discussion of the possibility and nature of ethics, and whether it relates
natural properties to ethical properties so as to justify or defy naturalization, in an
early Confucian text, the Xunzi.
3 Donald Munro, A Chinese Ethics for the New Century (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2005),
pp. 47–48.
4 Ibid., chapter 4.
5 Ibid., chapter 5. Mencius lived during the fourth century BCE and is considered the second most
important thinker in Confucianism after Confucius. Recent publications in Chinese philosophy that adopt
such naturalizing approach include a special issue on “Ethics, Reasoning, and Empirical Science,” The
Journal of Chinese Philosophy and Culture 9 (2011), and Edward Slingerland, “Metaphor and Meaning in
Early China,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 10 (2011): 1–30.
6 Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Tian as a Source for Ethical Warrant in Early Confucianism,” Dao: A Journal of
Comparative Philosophy 6 (2007): 211–220, p. 213. Perkins argues that Mencius uses tian as “a way of
discussing the natural order of things.” Franklin Perkins, “Reproaching Heaven: The Problem of Evil in
Mengzi,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 5 (2006): 293–312, p. 296.
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1 Xunzi and Naturalism
Disagreement about the basis and nature of ethics dates back to the early days of
Confucianism. Mencius’ arch rival, Xunzi (ca. 310–220 BCE), dismissed as self-
defeating his attempt to defend Confucius’ normative teachings by grounding
ethical goodness in characteristics humans are born with. Instead, Xunzi maintained
that human nature is bad and ethical life is possible only because of what humans
created via their artificial activities and products, most important of which being the
social institutions of ritual (li 禮). This disagreement resonates with an older
naturalism debate in ancient Greece over whether morality arises from nature or
from conventions. In contemporary ethical discussions, ethics grounded in
conventions is considered naturalistic, and ethics grounded in human nature would
not be naturalistic if human nature is received from a supernatural source, such as
endowed by tian (heaven conceived religiously), if humanity is more than or other
than a natural species. If one is interested in finding naturalistic support for the
normative claims of Confucian ethics in today’s psychological and other empirical
investigation into characteristics humans share at birth, human capacity and
behavior, and their social consequences, for example, Xunzi would seem a more
likely candidate than Mencius given that his conception of tian, in its indifference to
human plight and ethical quest, bears more resemblance to the concept of nature in
today’s scientific worldview.
The ancient Chinese did not have a single term with the same meanings and
references as the English “nature,” or the ancient Greek “phusis.” Instead, a cluster
of terms in ancient Chinese texts overlap with them in meanings and references: tian
天 (sky/heaven) or tiandi天地 (heaven and earth), xing性 ([human] nature), dao
(way), li 理 (pattern/coherence), ziran 自然 (self-so/spontaneity), and wanwu 萬物
(myriad things).7 The Xunzi has a chapter titled “Tianlun 天論,” which John
Knoblock translates as “Discourse on Nature,” wherein tian or tiandi (heaven and
earth) refers to natural phenomena, “the revolutions of the sun and moon and the
stars and celestial points that mark off the divisions of time by which the calendar is
calculated,” the seasons, spring and summer, autumn and winter (17.4), the
phenomena of flood and drought, cold and heat (17.1), wind and rain (17.2b).8
Edward Machle warns that translating tian as “nature” introduces systematic
distortions that lead to misunderstandings of Xunzi; Janghee Lee accepts that tian
7 It should be noted that the concept of nature (and its equivalent in other European languages) also has
many different meanings since ancient times. Han Ulrich Vogel and Gu¨nter Dux (eds.), Concepts of
Nature: A Chinese-European Cross-Cultural Perspective (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 16–19. See also
Geoffrey E.R. Lloyd, “Greek Antiquity: The Invention of Nature,” in John Torrance (ed.), The Concept of
Nature (Oxford, United Kingdom: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 6 and p. 13; Gerard Naddaf, The Greek
Concept of Nature (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005); Kate Soper, What is Nature?
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); Peter Coates, Nature: Western Attitudes since Ancient Times (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1998); and Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, 2nd edition
(London: Fontana, 1983), pp. 219–220.
8 In-text citations of the Xunzi will give book and section numbers from John Knoblock’s translation, or
only page numbers from Burton Watson’s translation. John Knoblock (trans.), Xunzi: A Translation and
Study of the Complete Works, 3 Vols. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988, 1990, 1994). Burton
Watson (trans.), Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).
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refers to objective natural phenomena or conditions, which are however not viewed
as “mechanical, value-free, and exploitable,” implicitly rejecting a view of
disenchanted nature often attributed to modern science.9 Xunzi’s reference to
“constancy in the course of tian” (17.1) has been compared with laws of nature.10
Xunzi rejected any suggestion that rituals performed during droughts and eclipses,
and divinations conducted before some important undertakings, could produce
results by some supernatural forces. Only the vulgar masses would believe in such
forces, an exemplary person recognizes that ritual performances are ceremonies “to
embellish such occasions” (17.8). Xunzi also explained mourning rituals and their
forms in terms of their symbolic meaning and impact on the emotions and ethical
life of the mourners, and on social order – explanations that do not require the
participation of supernatural beings such as ghosts or spirits, the existence of which
he (19.11; 21.8) explicitly denied. Xunzi’s philosophy may be considered
naturalistic in rejecting belief in the supernatural, “the invocation of an agent or
force that somehow stands outside the familiar natural world and whose doings
cannot be understood as part of it”.11
Xunzi seemed to share contemporary philosophers’ naturalistic view that “there
is no cosmic plan which aims at man’s survival or at achieving his ideals, for to his
lot the universe is morally indifferent.”12 In the tianlun, tian has neither intentions
nor purposes. It does not desire or act like human beings. It is equally unresponsive
to sages and villains: “The course of Nature is constant: it does not survive because
of a Yao; it does not perish because of a Jie” (17.1).13 This contrasts with other
ancient Chinese views of tian as normative agent or force intervening in human
affairs while aligning well with the modern disenchanted view of nature. A problem
that arises for contemporary naturalistic ethical theories that view this disenchanted
nature as the sum total of reality is the place of ethical values. While Xunzi did not
9 Edward J. Machle, Nature and Heaven in the Xunzi (Albany: State University of New York Press,
1993), p. 2 and p. 13; Janghee Lee, Xunzi and Early Chinese Naturalism (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2005), p. 22. See also Homer H. Dubs, Hsüntse, the Moulder of Ancient Confucianism
(London: Probsthain, 1927), pp. 62–63; Robert Eno, The Confucian Creation of Heaven (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1990), chapter 6.
10 For discussion of whether the concept of natural laws or laws of nature exists in pre-modern Chinese
see Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China: History of Scientiﬁc Thought (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1956), Vol. 2, pp. 518–583; Derk Bodde, “Evidence for ‘Laws of Nature’ in
Chinese Thought,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 20 (1957): 709–727, and “Chinese ‘Laws of
Nature’: A Reconsideration,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 39 (1979): 139–155; Christoph
Harbsmeier, “Towards a Conceptual History of Some Concepts of Nature in Classical Chinese: Zi Ran
and Zi Ran Zhi Li,” in Vogel and Dux, op. cit, 220–254.
11 Barry Stroud, “The Charm of Naturalism,” in De Caro and Macarthur, op. cit.; Nicholas L. Sturgeon,
“Ethical Naturalism,” in David Copp (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), pp. 91–121.
12 Ernest Nagel, Logic Without Metaphysics (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1956), p. 50.
13 Xunzi is not alone in viewing nature as non-purposive, non-intentional, and in some cases non-
normative; this could even be considered a dominant trend in third century (BCE) China. Angus Graham,
Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Arguments in Ancient China (La Salle: Open Court, 1989), p. 235;
Eno, op. cit., p. 132; Schwartz, Benjamin, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge: Belknap,
Harvard University of Press, 1985), p. 309; Heiner Roetz, “On Nature and Culture in Zhou China,” in
Vogel and Dux, op. cit., 198–219, pp. 204–209.
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directly address the problem of normativity that is at the center of contemporary
discussions of ethical naturalism, his ethical discussions implicitly relate ethical
properties to natural properties. In the following sections, I shall consider whether
these relations could be reconstructed today so that identification, explanation, and
justification of ethical properties are based on the methods of science, or at least
must take into account empirical evidence, before concluding with some remarks on
the extent to which Xunzi’s own views about the basis of ethics and the place of
human beings in the cosmos constrain how far one should go with the naturalistic
approach if one shares Xunzi’s desire to defend Confucian ethics as a contemporary
option.
2 Naturalizing Ethical Properties of Agents
What makes human beings ethical? Naturalists seek answers to this question in the
natural properties of humans, including human nature – common traits humans are
born with. The Chinese term, xing性, in the Xunzi has been translated into “human
nature.” Xunzi famously claimed that “human nature is bad” against Mencius’ claim
that “human nature is good.” Whereas Mencius believed that humans are born with
the beginnings of virtues that naturally develop and issue in ethical conduct, Xunzi
maintained that ethical norms and conduct are the products of human actions,
“conscious exertion/activity (wei 偽)” (23.1a). For Xunzi, human nature as part of
nature, “the consequence of tian” (22.5b; 23.1c), comprises of physical desires and
feelings that, left to themselves, would result in unethical behavior. These desires
common to all human beings include the desire for food, warmth, rest, things that
delight the taste buds and other senses, sight, hearing, smell, and touch; they extend
to desires for profit and worldly status. Trying to satisfy them leads to competition
that arouses emotions of envy and hatred, and causes violence and crime, and
“wanton and dissolute behavior” (23.1a). Xunzi (4.10) went so far as to claim that
all humans are born petty persons (xiaoren小人) who are the opposite of exemplary
persons (junzi君子). He insisted that conscious activity and not human nature is the
basis of ethical good because ethical norms, encompassed by the concept of “ritual
and propriety (liyi 禮義)” – which tells us what to choose, how to act, and how to
live (1.8) – were created by ancient sage-kings (19.1a; 23.3a) and ethical conduct
continues to be possible only through human effort at learning, with human
intervention and use of various social devices, such as texts, models, and liyi
(23.1a). Without conscious exertion to restrain and transform their bad nature,
people are similarly unethical; with conscious exertion, some will become ethical
while others who refuse to learn, or are unfortunate in the company they keep or the
government that rules them, may remain bad or become even worse than human
beings naturally are (4.10).
Although Xunzi did not employ any term that directly translates “empirical
evidence,” such evidence understood as the results of observation, study, and
thought is relevant to his identification of the traits of human nature, his description
of ethical agents and conduct, and the process of ethical learning; they are also
present in Xunzi’s reasoning and justification of Confucian ethical norms. In
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becoming ethical, a person acquires ethical properties through a natural process
involving other persons and human creations such as texts and liyi. In the context of
contemporary naturalism, human beings are a natural species and products of human
mental activity and actions are natural facts insofar as they are accountable by
science or more broadly empirical.14 However, before we conclude that the ethical
properties of human agents in the Xunzi are natural properties because they are
identified empirically and produced by a process that we can construe as natural, we
need to push the question further back and ask how it is possible for sages to create
the ethical norms, liyi. Does that process of originating goodness – not how
individual humans born with bad nature acquire ethical properties but how anything
ethical first occur in human society – involve anything supernatural?
Some interpreters see a contradiction between Xunzi’s account of the origin of
goodness and his own claim that “human nature is bad.” They attribute to Xunzi the
implicit view that the origin of goodness lies in humans sorting out the chaotic mix
of good and bad elements that are both found in human nature, which is inconsistent
with his explicit claim that human nature is bad.15 Other interpretors see human
nature in the Xunzi as neutral but leading to bad consequences – this may be more
charitable than the first view if one argues that “bad” only means “undesirable, less
than ideal,” without being ethically bad.16 Chenyang Li avoids making Xunzi
inconsistent by interpreting his claim that human nature is bad not only because
natural desires have unethical consequences, but also because it includes a natural
tendency to act on these desires which amounts to “a tendency to generate disorder”
– this second aspect of human nature is itself ethically bad.17
Li prefers an account that has Xunzi drawing “material source from human qing
情 (feelings), yu 欲 (desires), and zhi 知 (intelligence),” but identifies as “efficient
cause” of goodness the “sage-king’s aversion to disorder (wu qiluan 惡其亂).”18
While the text mentions that aversion to explain why the sage-kings created liyi,
Li’s interpretation implies that this aversion is distinct from feelings and desires that
make up human nature. If the aversion to disorder is reduced to desire for order,
which is arguably an ethical desire, then his interpretation would collapse into that
of attributing both good and bad elements to human nature in the Xunzi. Even if one
grants Li the conceptual distinction between dislike for disorder and desire for
order, Xunzi explicitly includes aversion/dislike (wu 惡) among feelings – “The
feelings of liking and disliking, of delight and anger, and of sorrow and joy that are
inborn in our nature are called ‘emotions’ [qing]” (22.1b; see also 20.3) – Li himself
cites this passage. Unless there is some way of distinguishing aversion to disorder
14 Sturgeon, op. cit., p. 92.
15 Graham, op. cit., p. 248. Chenyang Li points out that this view had been suggested earlier by Chinese
scholar Wang Guowei (1877–1927). Chenyang Li, “Xunzi on the Origin of Goodness: A New
Interpretation,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38 (2011): 46–63, p. 50.
16 Kim-Chong Chong, “Xunzi and the Essentialist Mode of Thinking on Human Nature,” Journal of
Chinese Philosophy 35 (2008): 63–78. Those who understand e惡 as crude or unadorned include Rokuro
Kodama, Xunzi’s Thought (Tokyo: Kozama Shobo, 1992).
17 Li, op. cit., p. 54; see also Antonio S. Cua, Human Nature, Ritual, and History: Studies in Xunzi and
Chinese Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2005), p. 21.
18 Li, op. cit., p. 56.
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from the disliking that falls under human nature, it would not provide an origin of
goodness that is consistent with Xunzi’s insistence that goodness does not come
from human nature.19
The chaotic state of nature described by Xunzi, with everyone pursuing their
natural desires and consequently fighting over scarce resources and getting in one
another’s way, would certainly give rise to feelings of aversion. However, such
aversion, insofar as they are not yet a moral sentiment but purely self-regarding and
self-serving, would be aversion to the frustration of more basic desires, which will
only motivate actions aimed at winning the fight in this chaos and will not produce
the ethically good. Li offers a thought experiment to explain how goodness might be
produced from such a state of nature when some who dislike the chaos of that
situation were “intelligent enough to think of a way to do something about it.”20
What started out as prudential solutions to satisfy nature acquired authority over
time so that might (of higher problem solving accomplishments) becomes right
(ethically exemplary practices and rules). While highly plausible, this is not Xunzi’s
story. Furthermore, this story still locates the origin of goodness in a combination of
nature and intelligence, and intelligence seems to be more of an efficient cause than
the aversion to disorder. More important, it does not exclude aversion to disorder,
qua feeling, from human nature as Li wishes to. Xunzi’s own definition of xing
(human nature) provides a clue for excluding from this concept the sage-king’s
aversion to disorder that produces goodness in the form of liyi:
That which is as it is from the time of birth is called the nature of man [xing].
That which is harmonious from birth, which is capable of perceiving through
the senses and of responding to stimulus spontaneously and without effort, is
also called the nature. (p. 139)
The spontaneous dislike of having one’s natural desires frustrated becomes an
“aversion to disorder” only with a normative judgment that takes into account the
macro picture of the world beyond the focus on satisfying one’s own desires.
Normative judgment involves more than sense perception and spontaneous,
effortless response to stimuli that are natural endowments; it involves thinking
and knowledge that, by Xunzi’s definition, are not part of inborn nature, but an
instance of conscious activity requiring deliberate effort.
The origin of goodness, as the introduction of ethical normativity into the world,
involves deliberate human action that cannot be attributed as a part or purely a
product of what Xunzi defined as human nature. The aversion to disorder which
motivated the sage-kings to create liyi, qua feeling, may be part of nature, but it is
the normative judgment of the disliked situation as disorder that produces the
normative norms of liyi. Furthermore, Xunzi explicitly related the origin of orderly
society to yi 義, which distinguishes humanity from natural phenomena and
animals, and yi has been understood as a capacity for normative judgment:
19 Ibid., p. 50.
20 Ibid., p. 58.
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Fire and water possesses vital breath but have no life. Plants and trees possess
life, but lack awareness. Birds and beasts have awareness, but lack yi 義.
Humans possess vital breath, life, and awareness, and add to them yi. It is for
this reason that they are the noblest beings in the world. … Thus, that they put
the four seasons in their proper sequence and control the myriad things,
universally benefitting the whole world, is due to no other cause than that they
make social distinctions (fen 分) with yi (9.16a).21
Making of social distinctions with yi established the norms of liyi – rules and
practices that govern the division of labor and responsibilities, allocation of
resources, assign ranks that determine precedence and privileges, justify and express
respect or contempt.
John Knoblock translates yi into “sense of morality and justice,” and Burton
Watson (p. 45) “sense of duty.” Indeed, the term in Confucian discourse is often
used with ethical meaning, as rightness or appropriateness. In the Mencius, it refers
to one of the Confucian virtues for which there is a natural beginning. Li rejects
understanding yi in the Xunzi (9.16a) as a full-blown ethical property on the grounds
that being born with a sense of rightness implies that human beings will naturally
become good, in fact is already good at birth, which is contrary to Xunzi’s insistence
that human nature is bad. However, this confuses two distinct meanings of human
nature.22 The passage did not actually claim that human beings are born with yi,
only that it distinguishes human beings from natural phenomena and other living
things. Although we sometimes mean by human nature what distinguishes human
beings from other species, this meaning is distinct from the meaning of common
traits human beings are born with, even though contingently one trait/characteristic/
property may belong to both types. Only the latter but not the former meaning
figures in Xunzi’s explicit definition of human nature (22.1b). Li interprets the
above passage (9.16a) to mean that yi is a “potential capacity in humanity” only
actualized with the creation of liyi and that yi therefore cannot explain the origin of
goodness since it is itself either the result of or coexists with liyi. I agree with Li that
yi is not an innate capacity human beings are born with; Xunzi did not claim that it
is and actually implied that it is not. For Xunzi (9.16a), “from birth all men are
capable of forming society,” but such associations are chaotic without social
distinctions, which requires yi. From the account that follows, of how society
becomes orderly through making social distinctions, it is clear that liyi is the product
of making social distinctions with yi. Contrary to Li’s interpretation, yi must exist
before the creation of liyi even though it clearly continues to exist as part of liyi after
its creation. It would be consistent with the passage to understand yi as a capacity
that evolves in human interaction and therefore is a product of what Xunzi calls
“conscious exertion/activity” – this would not stop it from being a unique
distinguishing property of humanity that explains the creation of liyi, including
ethical norms.
21 Translation modified from Knoblock’s: “…developed social classes from their sense of morality and
justice.”
22 Li, op. cit., p. 55.
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The above passage also rules out the view that goodness originates in zhi 知,
which Knoblock translates as “awareness,” but it also means knowledge,
intelligence, and wisdom.23 Xunzi did not believe that knowledge or the ability to
acquire it, which he attributed also to birds and beasts, is what enables human beings
to create ethical norms. Li cites a different passage from the chapter on “Enriching
the State” (10.1) that gives some credence to Fung Yu-lan’s view by ending an
argument for instituting social distinctions with “the wise instituted class
divisions.”24 Li rejects this view because for him intelligence or wisdom (zhi) alone
cannot motivate the sage-king’s creation of liyi – but one could find the required
motivation in the desire for economic prosperity. It needs to be pointed out that this
chapter is among Xunzi’s attempts to render Confucian ethics realistic, in this case by
arguing for its economic rationality. From this perspective, social distinctions and by
extension ethical practice and social order are being promoted as the way for a
country to become rich, in other words, only intelligence is needed to grasp this
solution to the economic problem. One could provide further support for the view
that “goodness originates in intelligence” by considering yi itself (in 9.16a) as a
particular or superior kind of knowing or intelligence so that the normative judgment
required to dislike disorder is still explained by the natural property of intelligence.25
We can then tell an evolutionary story to explain the difference between birds and
beasts, with zhi but no yi, and human beings with zhi and yi. David Nivison
considered and eventually rejected this reading in favor of understanding yi as a
“sense of duty” because he believed Xunzi held a deontological view of morality –
attributing intrinsic value to ethical norms, which are to be chosen for its own sake –
even when he offered consequentialist arguments for it.26
Whether yi and intelligence are similar in kind, it is clear that both moral sense
and intelligence interpretations of yi place it in the domain of the mind (xin 心) as
they both involve thought, which separates but also relates nature (xing) to
conscious exertion/activity (wei) in the Xunzi.
The likes and dislikes, delights and angers, griefs and joys of the nature are
called emotions. When the emotions are aroused and the mind makes a choice
from among them, this is called thought. When the mind conceives a thought
and the body puts it into action, this is called conscious activity. When thoughts
have accumulated sufficiently, the body is well-trained, and then the action is
carried to completion, this is also called conscious activity. (pp. 139–140)
Xunzi explicitly explained the sage-king’s creation of liyi, despite sharing human
beings’ bad nature, in terms of conscious exertion involving thought that goes
beyond spontaneous response of natural desires and feelings.
23 Fung Yu-lan 馮友蘭, A History of Chinese Philosophy (中國哲學史) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju,
1961), p. 365.
24 Li, op. cit., p. 48.
25 Lee H. Yearley, “Hsu¨n Tzu on the Mind: His Attempted Synthesis of Confucianism and Taoism,” The
Journal of Asian Studies 39 (1980): 465–480, p. 477.
26 David S. Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy, in Bryan Van
Norden (ed.) (La Salle: Open Court, 1996), p. 207, pp. 209–120.
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Someone may ask: “If man’s nature is bad, how then are liyi created?” … The
sage accumulates his thoughts and ideas. He masters through practice the
artificial skills [xiwei習偽] in order to produce ritual and appropriateness, set
up models and standards.” (23.2a)27
It is the mind’s intervention with thought – disrupting the spontaneous response of
human nature, which as such is no different from birds’ and beasts’ behavior – that
produces conscious activity or deliberate action that can have ethical properties.
The desire itself, which arises before one knows whether or not it can be
satisfied, comes from the nature received at birth, while the search to satisfy it
as best one can is directed by the mind. Thus a single desire which has sprung
from the inborn nature may be directed and controlled in many ways by the
mind, until it becomes difficult to identify it with the original desire. There is
nothing a man desires more than life and nothing he hates more than death.
And yet he may turn his back on life and choose death, not because he desires
death and does not desire life, but because he cannot see his way clear to live,
but only to die. Therefore, though a man’s desires are excessive, his actions
need not be so, because the mind will stop them short. If the dictates of the
mind are in accord with just principles [li 理], then, although the desires are
manifold, what harm will this be to good government? Conversely, even
though there is a deficiency of desire, one’s action can still come up to the
proper standard because the mind directs them.28
An ethical person is one whose mind directs her actions in a certain way. Is the mind
a natural faculty? It would be too hasty to conclude that because thought, unlike
desires and feelings, are not part of human nature (xing), the mind must therefore be
considered a supernatural faculty in Xunzi’s philosophy. The “Discourse on Nature”
describes the mind governing the five senses of eye, ear, nose, mouth, body, which
are “tian-faculties (tianguan 天官)” (17.3a). If we understand the five senses as
natural faculties, as all humans are born with those senses, then it seems to follow
that the mind, as “the lord provided by nature/natural lord (tianjun天君),” also must
be natural. Does interpreting the mind as natural, as the context of this chapter urges
the reader, coupled with the normative function of the mind, generates an
inconsistency with Xunzi’s claim that goodness does not come from human nature?
Although human nature comes from nature (tian), this does not necessarily imply
that everything that is part of human beings and comes from tian is human nature as
Xunzi defines it. Robert Eno argues that the mind as a ruling faculty comes not from
tian as disenchanted nature, but from tian understood as having ethical
significance.29 Even though the text probably uses tian with different meanings, I
27 Cf. Watson’s (p. 160) translation: “The sage gathers his thoughts and ideas, experiments with various
forms of conscious activity, and so produces ritual principles and sets forth laws and regulations.”
28 Watson’s translation, p. 151; see also p. 152, “While all human beings have desires by nature, it is the
function of the intellect (zhi) to guide the search for satisfaction.”
29 Eno, op. cit., pp. 158–163. Goldin compares Xunzi to the Deists, for whom reason is the faculty given
to human beings by God to discover his will, which means perceiving the laws of nature. Paul Rakita
Goldin, Rituals of the Way (La Salle: Open Court, 1999), pp. 51–54.
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wish to pursue the meaning of tian as disenchanted nature to see if one could
naturalize Xunzi’s ethics without contradicting his insistence that human nature is
bad.
The distinction the text makes between the mind as a ruling faculty and the
physical senses is important in understanding why Xunzi did not include it as human
nature, which however will not prevent us from retrospectively construing it as a
natural faculty with normative functions but without adopting any normative
conception of nature. The responses of the physical senses to the natural
environment give rise to spontaneous desires and feelings, and Xunzi believed
that these senses need no training/learning to function (4.9) – therefore they are part
of human nature by Xunzi’s standards. These natural faculties are not aware of
ethical norms and pandering to them often leads to bad consequences (11.4). When
he discussed the mind together with the physical senses, which suggests that it also
comes from nature, the mind is as prone to ethical error as the physical senses
(11.7b; 23.2a). The mind is “like the mouth and stomach” if a person “lacks a
teacher and model” (4.10) – that is, without learning and personal cultivation, the
mind in its natural state would be as oblivious of ethical norms as the physical
senses. This is why thought does not always result in ethical actions; not all
conscious exertions of human beings are ethical.
The mind, according to Xunzi, can be darkened or purified. Darkening the mind
“destroys the achievement of nature” while purifying the mind “completes nature’s
achievement” (17.3a). This suggests that even if the mind is a natural faculty in the
sense that all humans have minds from birth, it only functions as a normative faculty
after particular human practice – reflection and reasoning, studying, learning –
purifies rather than darkens it. The early chapter on learning takes an extreme view
of learning as independent of human natural abilities, comparing learning to the use
of horses and vehicles for transport that does not improve one’s natural
characteristics or give us new abilities (1.3). However, this completely external
view of learning is qualified in “The Teachings of the Ru,” which offers a more
considered and certainly more plausible view that combines the roles of natural
abilities and human effort in the process of learning and becoming ethical. Rather
than being completely separate, nature provides the raw material for human effort,
and learning transforms bad human nature (8.11; 19.6). Purification of the mind is
part of this transformation process. Xunzi did not include the mind as part of human
nature even though human beings are born with minds because the normative
function of the mind, which comes about only with human practice, is more
important than its natural genesis in understanding human beings and their
important difference from all other existents. In the contemporary context, one
could reconstruct this account by understanding the mind as a both natural and
normative faculty where the normative functions come from human practices which
are natural processes or products. Ethical properties of human agents are therefore
natural properties, or at least could be identified and explained without bringing in
anything supernatural.
There is a tension between Xunzi’s emphasis on the importance of external aids –
ritual and appropriateness, standards and models – in the process that transforms
human beings born with bad xing to exemplary persons who act ethically on the one
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hand, and on the other hand, his explanation of those external aids as being created
by sages, who surely also started out as human beings with bad xing. How were
sages able to disrupt the spontaneous response of human nature without the learning
facilitated by ritual and appropriateness, which had yet to be created?30 Xunzi’s
account indicates that the sages learned by reflecting on experience and, through
practical experience, developed skills that eventually enabled them to create norms
and standards that have aided future generations to become ethical. What accounts
for the difference between sages who created ritual and appropriateness and other
human beings who become ethical only with the aid of these creations? Xunzi could
be implying that, even though all are born with bad xing, human beings are not born
equal with regard to the purity of their minds or other mental capacities he did not
include in human nature. The sages were born with pure (or less darkened) minds, or
greater reflective and other mental capacities, than ordinary human beings. Xunzi’s
teachings were aimed at the average human being. He was being realistic in not
assuming that everyone can be a sage (as Mencius claimed) and consequently
preferred to rely on the inherited creations of past sages for continued edification of
naturally bad human beings.
I prefer a different interpretation of the sages’ creation of liyi and its significance
for ethics. Although most ordinary human beings require external aids to become
ethical, it is not the only (human) way. Learning through experience, combining
practice and reflection, could also achieve the ethical in the absence of external aids
such as inherited norms, whether in individual action or in more enduring forms of
new ethical norms. This means that although the kind of ethical achievements
represented by the sages’ creation of ritual and appropriateness are rare, they could
still occur and would occur when historical circumstances of chaos demand such
innovation. The origin of goodness is not the extraordinary capacities of the sages
but contingent reflective experiences of ordinary human beings who started with bad
human nature but through their efforts (and some luck) can become extraordinary
initiators of ethical traditions.
3 Naturalizing Ethical Properties of Beliefs and Actions
Confucian ethics has been interpreted as a kind of virtue ethics because of its
concern with agents’ character and the question, “What kind of person should one
become?” This contrasts with the question, “What should one do?” in ethical
theories emphasizing moral principles or consequences of action.31 Xunzi’s ethics is
agent-centric in its preoccupation with personal cultivation and the crucial ethical
roles given to sages and exemplary persons: learning’s “real purpose is to create a
scholar and in the end to create a sage” (1.8; 19.2d). The text often distinguishes
ethical from unethical ways – courses of actions, patterns of conduct – by attributing
them to ethical exemplars and their opposites. If this focus on agents and their
characters implies that the ethical properties of beliefs and actions are completely
30 I thank the anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.
31 Roger Crisp, Virtue Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 623.
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derived from the ethical properties of agents – a belief or an action is ethical if and
only if it is the belief or the action of an ethical person – then naturalizing the ethical
properties of agents will be sufficient to naturalize Xunzi’s ethics. However, this
may be too hasty and a closer scrutiny of his discussions of the ethical properties of
beliefs and actions is needed.
Ordinary individuals starting out with bad human nature acquire their ethical
properties with external help by acting in accordance with the ethical standards of
liyi or a teacher – the ethical properties of actions that contribute to their personal
cultivation are not derived from themselves as agents, but one could nevertheless
argue that they are derived from some other agents, sages and teachers, with ethical
properties. However, in Xunzi’s account of the origin of goodness in human
practice, insofar as yi is not part of human nature and first arose in human
interaction, it is arguably a property of actions – a particular way of social
interaction, of organizing society – before it became a property of beliefs and
agents. It is only after certain practices making social distinctions came to be
adopted by many who acknowledge their contributions to better lives for all that
these social distinctions became ethical standards and agents who initiated these
social distinctions were then identified as having yi as a normative sense. The ethical
properties of the creators of liyi who first introduced normativity into human
experience seem to have been derived from some particular practices that first
purified their minds so that they could distinguish between better and worse ways of
interacting. It seems that ethical properties of the first ethical agents come from
ethical actions rather than the other way round.
It is questionable if the ethical properties of liyi are entirely derived from the
ethical properties of their creators. Sage-kings probably were recognized as having
the ethical properties of sages only in retrospect, after particular practices and rules
they initiated had proven efficacious and became accepted as authoritative over
time. From this perspective, one could argue that the ethical properties of sages
were attributed based on their creation of liyi, and therefore derived from
(recognition of) the ethical properties of practices that became liyi rather than the
other way round. The ethical property of sageliness may consist of nothing more
than the creation of liyi – they became sages because certain practices they initiated
through reflective experience became authoritative norms as liyi and not the other
way round. Nevertheless, Xunzi often justified liyi with the authority of the sage-
kings and other ethical exemplars. From a contemporary perspective, one would ask
how does one know exemplars from their opposites, and the answers would
probably cite actions that distinguish their characters from others, bringing the
discussion back to ethical properties of actions. This interprets the authority or
wisdom of sage-kings and other ethical exemplars as resting on their having
invented or upholding ethical norms that had worked. Such authority and wisdom
are sustained by the continued efficacy of the norms; if the norms start to fail, then
the authority and wisdom of the sage kings cannot be cited to justify continuing with
them. This means that ethical beliefs and actions have pragmatic bases independent
of the ethical properties of their creators or agents. Despite Xunzi’s own strong
traditionalist inclinations, a contemporary reconstruction of his ethics need not
dogmatically accept the authority of ancient sages because there are alternative
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justifications for ethical norms in the text. Instead of a dogmatic traditionalism
defending whatever norms have been attributed to the sage-kings, Xunzi’s ethics
will be more relevant today if its traditionalism is limited to a belief that there are
often good reasons why certain norms have worked for a long time, and these should
not be carelessly abandoned unless really warranted by relevant change in
circumstances.
A better contemporary reconstruction is possible with Xunzi’s consequentialist
justifications of liyi in terms of ending disorder and maintaining harmony in society, in
which ethical properties of norms, rules, and actions dependnot solely onagents but also
on external circumstances and courses of events. Xunzi himself emphasized the
interaction between human agents and what Xunzi identified as nature (tian). Ethical
actions have better consequences because they are more appropriate responses to
natural phenomena,whichhavenoethical properties but need tobe taken into account in
human practice as they affect the outcome of actions. Nature (including bad human
nature) can be taken into account because it has constancy (chang常, 17.1). Although
nature does not give human practice its ethical properties, its constancy can explainwhy
ethical norms, the way (dao) that ethical conduct follows, can be constant (17.5). Xunzi
seemed to think that very little changes about the pattern or course of tian, and human
nature will always be bad before the intervention of human practice, but whether this
constancy is contingent and relative, or absolute and a priori, whether the way is
enduring or timeless (changjiu 長久, 10.10), comprehensive or universal (tong 通,
21.4), is a matter of debate between constructivist interpretations, such as Hagen’s and
those he calls realist interpretations, which view Xunzi as advocating an ethics of
unique, universal, and objective standards or principles based on a determinate order in
ultimate reality.32
David Nivison detected in the Xunzi a tendency to consider the way of the sages
“final and perfect,” which “can be thought of as (we might say) an overflowing into
the human social order of the necessity of the order of the universe as a whole.”33 In
Philip Ivanhoe’s interpretation of Xunzi, the sages show us “the one and only way to
a happy flourishing world” and only “Confucian rituals provide a way to realize an
orderly design inherent in the world.”34 Sage-kings were wise and able to govern
well because they “mark out the way” with rituals for others to follow (17.11).
According to Chad Hansen, Xunzi provided “an absolutist account of discovery of
the single correct dao.”35 “The world does not have two Ways, and the sage is not of
two minds” (21.1). Bryan Van Norden sees Xunzi as an “intellectualist” for whom
“knowledge guarantees right action.”36
32 Kurtis Hagen, The Philosophy of Xunzi: A Reconstruction (La Salle: Open Court, 2007), pp. 17–23.
33 David S. Nivison, “Replies and Comments,” in P.J. Ivanhoe (ed.), Chinese Language, Thought, and
Culture: Nivison and His Critics (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), 267–341, p. 331; The Ways of
Confucianism, p. 48.
34 Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Human Nature and Moral Understanding in the Xunzi,” in T.C. III Kline and Philip
J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), p. 240 and
p. 248.
35 Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992), p. 342.
36 Bryan Van Norden, “Introduction,” in Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism,” 1–13, p. 3.
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Only when the mind knows the way can it approve the way. And only after it
approves the way can it abide by the way and exclude what is contrary to it.
(21.5c)
In realist interpretations,whatmakes beliefs and actions ethical is correspondence to real
objective standards that may be immanent or transcendent; such objective standards
could be naturalistic. The orderly designmay be no different from the laws of nature that
scientists discover; the daomay be uniquely correct because it is the only way that takes
full account of the regularity of natural phenomena and provides the best outcome.
However, to naturalize the ethical properties of beliefs and actions by grounding them in
objective standards inherent in nature contradicts Xunzi’s insistence that his teachings
pertain to normative human ways (rendao人道) that bring order to the world through
human practice, in contrast to the ways of nature.37 “Theway ofwhich I speak is not the
way of heaven or the way of earth, but rather the way that guides the actions ofmankind
and is embodied in the conduct of the exemplary person” (8.3).
Anti-naturalistic interpretations are often premised on Xunzi continuing the
tradition of conceiving tian as Heaven that has normative properties or even moral
agency.38 Eno argues that Xunzi used tian as a normative term both in the normative
components of human psychology (the mind as tianjun) and as a prescriptive model
for emulation.39 Human beings are able to create ethical norms because they have
faculties endowed by nature that could follow or replicate an objective determinate
order found in nature.40 The exemplary person emulates the constancy of tian
(17.5). Key relationships, of ruler and minister, of father and son, and of husband
and wife, “share with Heaven and Earth the same orderly pattern” (9.15). The
distinction between “superior and inferior” is compared with, and seems implicitly
justified by, the distinction between heaven and earth (9.3). One to whom the world
would willingly submit because of his great ethical excellence “is as complete as
Heaven and Earth” (6.10; see also 10.2). The sage is often associated with heaven
and with the greatness of heaven and earth (3.9c; 8.11; 16.2; 19.2d). Some may
dismiss these as mere metaphors, or surviving remnants of an older understanding of
tian as moral force or judge that Xunzi carelessly included, or might have used for
rhetorical purpose. To Eno, such normative usages express the idea that the sage, the
exemplary person, and man “form a trinity” (Knoblock: “triadic partner”) with
heaven and earth, which amounts to striving to be tian’s equal by aspiring to the
grandeur and perfection of tian with one’s ethical achievements.41 I interpret that
triadic partnership as indicating that humanity could aspire to be the equal of nature
37 For references to rendao, see 16.2; 19.2d; 19.4a; 19.9c; 20.1; 21.9.
38 Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China’s Evolving Political
Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 264; Machle, op. cit.; Aaron Stalnaker,
Overcoming our Evil: Human nature and Spiritual Exercises in Xunzi and Augustine (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2007), pp. 70–71.
39 Eno, op. cit., pp. 158–165.
40 Cf. Goldin’s comparison of Xunzi to the Deists, for whom reason is the faculty given to human beings
by God to discover his will, which means perceiving the laws of nature, op. cit. pp. 51–54.
41 Eno, op. cit., p. 165. This “triad” (shen参) of heaven, earth, and human mentioned in 3.5; 8.11; 9.15;
13.9; 17.2a; 23.5a.
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in the ability to create ethical norms. Rather than normativity, value, or order being
inherent in nature and providing the objective basis for human creation of ethical
norms, if there is any value in nature, then it is the result of human creativity.
In the “Regulations of a King,” the description of the exemplary person as the
“triadic partner of Heaven and Earth” is preceded by a claim that “Heaven and Earth
gives birth to the exemplary person, and the exemplary person brings orderly pattern
(li 理) to Heaven and Earth,” and the exemplary person is able to accomplish this
because he “acts with ritual and appropriateness,” which are “the beginning of
order.”42 Rituals not only govern social interactions, but also ensure that all
agricultural, fishing, and hunting activities are carried out in the proper seasons, and
the use of the myriad things produced by heaven and earth follows an orderly
pattern. A sage king “scrutinizes Heaven above and establishes on Earth below; he
fills up and puts in order all that is between Heaven and Earth; and he adds his
works to the myriad things” (9.16c). Human beings become the equal of nature
when they are able to interact with nature in orderly ways that prevent them from
becoming mere victims of natural phenomena, and give them some measure of
control over their relations with nature, so that the relationship between humanity
and nature is interdependent rather than dependent, and results in order rather than
chaos from the human perspective. This seems to indicate that, instead of discerning
any order inherent in nature and emulating it, humans create order in their relations
with nature and thereby bring order to nature. Human beings respond to their natural
environment with certain practices. Some of these practices establish valuable
norms over time. These norms are valuable because of their perceived positive
effects on the interaction among human beings, and between them and their natural
environment. These positive effects are summarized as “bringing order to heaven
and earth,” that is, eliminating various problems that natural phenomena – from
violent weather to scarcity of resources – pose for human existence. Nature does not
provide bases or prescriptive models for ethical norms. Instead, ethical norms
invented through human practice enable humans to interact positively with their
natural environment. No mysterious supernatural or metaphysical relationship
between heaven/nature on the one hand and human beings and their ethical norms
on the other is necessary to make sense of the otherwise obscure idea of triadic
partnership with heaven and earth. Although its normativity is not part of nature,
ethical norms as human inventions are still natural in the contemporary sense.
Xunzi recommended a wide range of beliefs and actions as the ways of ethical
exemplars, including ancient kings (4.11; 10.10; 16.3; 19.4b; 20.1; 23.7; 24.5; 28.3),
true kings (9.9; 17.2; 20.5); sage kings (11.5b; 24.2), sages (8.7; 19.7b), an
intelligent ruler (12.8c), exemplary persons (8.13; 19.4a), and filial sons (23.1e;
27.82).43 These are contrasted with the ways of negative examples, such as
42 9.15. Knoblock translate “li” into “provides the organizing principle for”; cf. Sato’s “appreciates the
principle (i.e. order).” Masayuki Sato, The Confucian Quest for Order: The Origin and Formation of the
Political Thought of Xunzi (Leiden: Brill, 2003), p. 320.
43 Some exemplars whose ways are held up for emulation are named: Fuxi (25.13), Yao, Shun, Yu, and
Tang, often considered sage kings of ancient times (18.2; 23.8), King Wen (12.9; 25.13) and King Wu
(18.2; 25.13) of Zhou dynasty, and Chun Shen (314–238 BCE), a patron of Xunzi whom the text
compared to Confucius and described as a “great Ru (Confucian)” (25.11).
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avaricious rulers (9.5), degenerates/bad people (jianren 奸人, 19.4a; 19.5b);
despicable men (32.2); and “hirelings and menials who hawk and sell their labors by
day” (15.1d; 15.5). The respective ethical and unethical ways of exemplars and
negative examples are elaborated in terms of specific actions that people can and
should perform or avoid. Xunzi’s recommendations pertaining to the ways (dao) of
fulfilling various responsibilities, achieving various purposes, or solving various
problems are specific actions that people can perform. Even when dao is used
without specific qualifications – for example, “when the way is lost, the state is lost”
(12.6); “follow the way not the ruler” (13.2; 29.1); “when the world possesses the
way” (18.7) – we can make good sense of the text by understanding dao as specific
ethical ways of human practice. Rather than referring to some metaphysical
absolute, supernatural or transcendent entity, Xunzi was interested primarily in
ways that humans can walk, follow, cultivate, put into practice, abide by, maintain,
attain, perfect or make complete, ways that one can employ to guide, lead, and
transform others.
Instead of understanding the comprehensive way (tongdao通道) as including all
ways that bring order in various circumstances, some interpreters maintain that the
apparently natural, contingent, and relative ways all draw their normativity from the
singular, transcendent, universal way that is “the balance that enables the mind to
avoid obsessions in order to achieve sagely wisdom” (21.5b) and “the classical
standard and rational principle (jingli經理) of order” (22.3f).44 Such interpretations
assume that, in order to defend the Confucian way as the only true and correct way,
Xunzi must presuppose the source of normativity to be beyond the diverse changing
natural (including social) circumstances and courses of human actions: the
Confucian way corresponds with a singular, absolute, and transcendent way. Do
these interpretations pose insurmountable obstacles to the project of naturalizing
Xunzi’s ethics? Lee Yearley suggests that we read passages in the text that seem to
present Confucian moral views as universal truths corresponding to some higher
absolute reality as Xunzi’s exoteric teachings intended for the ethically less
advanced general audience who were better off accepting Confucian teachings as
absolute. In contrast, his more subtle esoteric teachings for the ethically more
advanced acknowledge that whether value judgments are right or wrong depends on
particular circumstances.45 Rather than knowing some transcendent dao as a
supernatural object, the balance that prevents the mind from becoming “obsessed by
a small corner of truth” requires acknowledging the contingent and relative nature
of all value judgments; misapprehending them as universal truths with transcendent
source of normativity would engender the very obsession Xunzi wanted to dispel.
Yearley admits that an ethics of contingent and relative value judgments gives
Xunzi no grounds to advocate the Confucian way as “the one eternally true way,”
but “his most basic reason for asking people to become Confucians remains intact: if
44 I would translate jingli 經理 as “the guides and patterns.” Cf. “the guides (jing) for order are rituals
and punishments” and “The classical standards of order are rituals associated with punishments” in 25.18.
45 Yearley, op. cit., p. 469 and p. 477.
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you become a Confucian you will become – or stand a good chance of becoming –
an admirable person.”46 Instead of knock-down arguments or philosophical proofs
that Confucianism is uniquely true and correct – which may not motivate people to
practice the Confucian way – Confucians persuade people to change with exemplars
of life worth living, by showing them which actions lead to order, harmony, and
peace in the world.47
4 Xunzi’s Anthropocentrism: Limits of Naturalization
A contemporary reconstruction of Xunzi’s ethics into a naturalistic ethics is possible
wherein normativity is created in human practice, in response to natural phenomena
and social circumstances. It takes value judgments to be ultimately relative and
contingent; but some judgments may for practical purposes be considered universal
due to the extensive regularity in natural phenomena and common human traits.
Such a naturalistic Xunzian ethics posits a continuity between disenchanted nature
and human experience, practice, and products; however, contemporary ethical
naturalism contrasts sharply with Xunzi’s own stark division between nature and
humanity.48 Is Xunzi’s division of xing and wei no more than what Nivison called
arbitrary linguistic legislation that even Confucians can legitimately ignore today?49
Or the distinction might be a specific response to the philosophical debates of
ancient times that are irrelevant to contemporary ethical discussions. For Xunzi,
how we use language has important implications for how we view the world and
live our lives. His xing-wei distinction is central to his philosophy and a
contemporary reconstruction has to take it seriously if it wishes to lay claim to
continuity with Xunzi’s own philosophy, let alone any stronger claim of being the
right interpretation. In the current context, reflecting on the significance of that
division for his ethics cautions us against narrow scientistic naturalism. Scientific
naturalism becomes scientistic when it is reductionistic, reducing social and human
sciences to natural sciences.
Xunzi’s philosophy is anthropocentric. Like all other Confucians, he sees
humankind as occupying a special place in the cosmos, contrary to contemporary
naturalistic philosophers for whom “man occupies no central position in the flux of
events.”50 The contemporary naturalistic perspective on human beings treats human
beings, human psychological activities, actions, practices, and conventions as
natural facts. Distinct from the objective view of thus seeing ourselves as just one
46 Ibid., pp. 477–479.
47 For the role and importance of moral exemplars in the Analects, read as moral theory, see Amy
Olberding, Moral Exemplars in the Analects (New York: Routledge, 2012). See also Sor-hoon Tan,
“Imagining Confucius: Paradigmatic Characters and Virtue Ethics,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 32
(2005): 409–426.
48 This contrast between natural and artificial, between nature and humanity, is not unique to Xunzi but is
fundamental to the most common sense of “nature” in many discourses of nature. Soper, op. cit., p. 15;
Coates, op. cit., p. 3.
49 Nivison, Ways of Confucianism, p. 212.
50 Nagel, op. cit., p. 50.
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thing in the world like any other, we also adopt the subjective view of ourselves
experiencing the world as external to us. While Xunzi himself did not address the
puzzle of our place in the world in terms of this dual perspective, the sharp division
he drew between tian and humans, and between our natural endowments (xing) and
conscious activity (wei), suggests that he would resist seeking answers to the
possibility and nature of ethics in the view of human beings as merely one natural
entity. He would be against studying human beings, their mental activity, actions,
practices, and conventions with methods similar to those used to study natural
phenomena that belong to the domains of physics, chemistry, or biology. In contrast
to the modern faith in science and its ability to expand our knowledge indefinitely,
Xunzi approaches the study of nature entirely from the perspective of human needs
and purposes (17.3b).51 Moreover, knowledge of nature is of secondary importance
compared to learning how to live which, being matters of conscious activity (wei), is
pursued from what moderns would call the subjective view, although Xunzi’s
approach would extend the subjective to intersubjective, rather than oppose it to the
objective view.52
A naturalistic reconstruction faithful to the spirit of Xunzi’s ethics would eschew
narrow scientistic naturalism that reduces all sciences to natural sciences, or worse
to physics. It is compatible with social and human sciences as empirical studies,
including experimental inquiries, provided these are ontologically and methodo-
logically irreducible to natural sciences, and takes seriously the subjective view of
human experience. Its understanding of the empirical would not be limited to
phenomena accountable with concepts permitted in the natural and social sciences,
but would include more broadly all human experience that can be communicated,
discussed, and investigated with some sharable and determinate, but open-ended
vocabulary. While firmly opposed to belief in anything supernatural, in occult
explanations or justifications, its respect for empirical evidence will nevertheless be
tentative about supposedly proven truths and remains open to the possibility that
some natural properties of human experience may not be accountable by science.
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